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Abstract
While much of the work on amicus briefs focuses on whether such briefs affect Supreme Court
outcomes or doctrine, much less is known about the content of these briefs, particularly how groups
opt to frame issues as part of their litigation strategy. In this study, I leverage an approach to
content analysis that has previously been used to analyze judicial opinions and use it to assess the
frames used by amicus groups in a single policy area over four decades. Using an original dataset
of amicus briefs filed in Supreme Court cases on the right to abortion, I test the claim from the
social movement literature that antiabortion groups have adopted the language of science in the
post-Roe era. However, I find only limited support for such a shift, suggesting that litigation
strategies may not track framing approaches used in other venues. Among antiabortion amici, only
health organizations rely upon science framing, partially neutralizing the monopoly that prochoice
health organizations had established with respect to scientific claims. By comparison, prochoice
groups generally employ more science framing in their briefs than prolife groups and show
evidence of calibrating this frame in response to changes in doctrine and court composition.
Beyond its contributions to illuminating the movement-countermovement dynamics in abortion
litigation, this study offers an approach that could be easily adapted to the study of other policy
areas, contributes to the literature on social movements and framing, and advances our
understanding of how organized interests assert themselves through the amicus curiae brief.
Keywords: abortion, framing, amicus brief, Supreme Court
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“She Blinded Me with Science”: The Use of Science Frames in Abortion Litigation Before
the Supreme Court
“The framing wars are very important, they are vital. People retain very little, so having the
right phrase or way of talking about an issue is key.”
--Representative, NARAL (June 16, 2006) 1
“I refuse to show pictures of dead babies … That’s what the old way was, and that’s why they
were losing all these years.”
-- Leslee Unruh, Vote Yes For Life2
In contested policy areas like abortion, organized interests devote a great deal of energy
in developing communication strategies for engaging with the public, the media, and
policymakers. The ability to persuade these audiences often turns on how the policy issue is
framed (Kahneman and Tversky 1984), as seen in the quotes from the activists above. But most
of what we know from the literature on social movements and framing focuses on how
movements engage with the media and the public, which overlooks another important venue that
social movement organizations use to push for policy change and to raise visibility: the courts.
And perhaps no policy issue is more entangled with the American judiciary than that of abortion.
The Supreme Court’s role in articulating a constitutional right to an abortion has made it the
subject of campaign rhetoric at both the state and federal levels (Abramowitz 1995; Roh and
Haider-Markel 2003) and a target for court-curbing legislation (Clark 2009). The abortion issue
has also become a major factor in selection of nominees to the High Court over the past four
decades (Collins and Ringhand 2013; Keck and McMahon 2016) and influences appointment
politics for lower courts as well (Steigerwalt 2010).

1

Quoted in Gerrity (2010: 60).
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This quote is drawn from a New York Times article by Monica Davey (November 1, 2006),

“National Battle over Abortion Focuses on South Dakota” (quoted in Siegel 2008: 1643).
2

Increasingly, scholars have observed that state laws limiting access to abortion have been
premised on claims such as fetal pain, asserted links between abortion and breast cancer, mental
health risks for women seeking abortions, and the asserted need for physicians who perform
abortions at clinics to have admitting privileges at nearby hospitals (Huff 2014; Guttmacher
Institute 2018; Howe 2020). Case studies of the antiabortion movement have argued that this is
part of a shift in strategy intended to make opposing abortion more palatable to a wider segment
of the public and to emphasize scientific and medical claims about abortion’s negative impacts
(Wolliver 1998; Gerrity 2020; Rose 2011).
When abortion restrictions are the subject of litigation, as was the case in the 2016
Supreme Court abortion decision (Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt), the arguments of the
litigants are accompanied by a chorus of other voices, who express their views on how the Court
should rule through amicus curiae (“friend of the court”) briefs. Compared to the cost of
sponsoring test cases (Collins 2012), amicus filings are relatively inexpensive and help interest
groups fulfill goals related to both policy (Wofford 2020) and organizational maintenance
(Solberg and Waltenburg 2006). Filings of amicus curiae briefs have also increased dramatically
in the modern era of Supreme Court litigation (Collins 2012; Kearney and Merrill 2000).3
Unfortunately, we know very little about the actual arguments raised in amicus briefs.
Most of the existing research focuses on the extent to which amicus briefs help inform justices’
votes and doctrine based on which side they support (Pacelle et al. 2018; Black and Owens 2011;
Collins 2008; Spriggs and Wahlbeck 1997). The little work that examines the content of amicus

3

The percentage of Supreme Court cases with amicus participation increased from about 60

percent in 1970 to around 97 percent during the Roberts Court (Collins 2012; Pacelle et al.
2018).
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briefs either takes a broad perspective across all issue areas (Wofford 2015; 2020) or analyzes a
small number of cases (Behuniak-Long 1991; Moyer, Balcom, and Hendricks 2019).4 However,
it is unclear whether these conclusions from this work hold up within a specific policy area over
a long period of time.
This paper has two main aims. First, I use amicus filings in Supreme Court abortion
litigation from 1973 to 2016 to assess whether a claim from the social movement literature about
the pro-life shift to science framing (Wolliver 1998; Gerrity 2020; Rose 2011) is supported in the
litigation context. Was the science frame heavily relied upon by prolife amici, only adopted by
certain types of organizations, or minimized relative to other frames? Did framing by prolife
groups shift in response to changes in legal doctrine or personnel changes on the Supreme Court?
Second, the paper showcases a promising new approach that extends techniques previously used
to study opinion content and demonstrates how they can be used to analyze amicus framing in a
single policy area over time.
Why focus on science as a frame? As the Science and Technology Studies (STS)
literature explains, framing an argument in scientific terms is a way to demonstrate credibility
and assert status (Epstein 1996; Layzer 2012). It is also a way to elevate and insulate claims, by
asserting that they are based on neutral and objective evidence, are unaffected by political forces
(Ahmed 2015), or come from experts. For judges looking to avoid moral pronouncements,
framing an issue in the language of science may provide an attractive way for judges to project
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As discussed later, Moyer, Balcom, and Hendricks (2019) employ only descriptive analyses on

briefs filed in four abortion cases, while Behuniak-Long (1991) analyzes framing in a single
abortion case. While illuminating, these studies do not enable us to draw conclusions about
abortion litigation over an extended period of time.
4

objectivity in their rulings (Chesler, Sanders, and Kalmuss 1988). Adopting a science frame in an
amicus brief could also neutralize an opponent’s monopoly on that frame and lessen their
influence (Solowiej and Collins 2009).5 However, judges’ lack of familiarity with scientific
methods may also make such frames less impactful (Hafemeister and Melton 1987).6
In the sections that follow, I discuss how science frames have been employed in public
policy narratives and compare prolife and prochoice approaches to framing the issue of abortion.
Then I lay out my hypotheses and test them on an original dataset of 359 amicus briefs filed over
four decades in Supreme Court litigation. The results suggest that earlier research has overstated
the extent to which abortion opponents changed their framing approach to emphasize science;
the findings also raise the possibility that the litigation context relies on different frames than
other kinds of outlets for advocacy. I conclude by discussing other applications for the
methodological approach used here and identifying directions for future research.

The Use of Science Frames in Public Policy Narratives

5

While Supreme Court influence is outside the scope of this paper, it is certainly reasonable to

assume that amici wish to persuade the justices to adopt favorable policy. However, using a
science frame could be part of a neutralizing strategy (Solowiej and Collins 2009) or tied to an
organization’s efforts to distinguish itself from others within the same policy space (Solberg and
Waltenburg (2006).
6

Social scientists generally agree that judges are not well-equipped by their training to assess

scientific evidence themselves (Guthrie et al. 2001; Foster and Huber 1997) or to evaluate
conclusions drawn by those asserting themselves as scientific experts (Benton et al. 2006;
Beecher-Monas 1998; Gatowski et al. 2001). Nevertheless, established legal doctrine (e.g.,
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals 1993) often requires judges to do both of these things.
5

Entman (1993: 52) argues that framing is primarily about selection and salience: to
“select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text,
in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral
evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation.” While frames serve as a simplifying tool for
helping individuals interpret the world around them (Goffman 1974; Kahneman and Tversky
1984), they also are commonly understood as strategic mechanisms for political actors and the
news media to shape others’ understanding (Merry 2013; Chong and Druckman 2007; Glazier
and Boydstun 2012). As Benford and Snow (2000) note, social movements employ frames in an
active, evolving process to construct meaning, often in response to the narratives and positions
their opponents have taken.
Framing a policy debate in scientific terms has important implications for both public
understanding and the formulation of public policy. Layzer (2012: 6) notes that scientific claims
carry more weight because of the status and cultural authority that science has in the U.S.
Characterizing an issue in terms related to science can be a way for a social movement to
enhance credibility and legitimacy among the public and key decisionmakers, in part by
appealing to scientific values like objectivity and intellectual rigor. Existing work has
highlighted the use of science frames in news coverage about genetically modified food (Yang,
Xu, and Rodriguez 2014) and molecular medicine (Ruhrmann et al. 2015), public debates about
fluoridation of water (Martin 1991) and teaching of evolution in schools (McCune 2003), as well
as predicting public attitudes about stem cell research (Stewart, Dickerson, and Hotchkiss 2009).
Within a single policy area, opposing sides may employ science frames in different ways.
For instance, in environmental policy, Layzer (2012) observes that
“advocates of more protective environmental policies publicize the worst-case scenarios
hypothesized by scientists, overstate the certainty of scientific knowledge, and press for an
6

early and stringent—or precautionary—policy response to avert catastrophe. By contrast,
opponents of such policies typically emphasize the uncertain state of current knowledge
or, if there is a strong scientific consensus that an environmental problem is genuine,
highlight dissenting views within the scientific community as to its magnitude, causes, or
consequences.”
This is illustrative of the way that social movement organizations can actively contest the way
that a frame is used by another group (Boscarino 2016) or challenge an opponent’s existing
monopoly on a particular frame (such as science).
One prominent perspective in the literature on science framing is the deficit, or science
literacy, model which assumes that attitudes about particular policies may be attributable to a
knowledge deficit that, once rectified, can lead to persuasion (Nisbet and Goidel 2007: 421).
This is the typical position held by public advocacy organizations and many educational
institutions, who seek the make the public and policy makers more “literate” on scientific
matters. However, the empirical support for this perspective is not encouraging, in large part due
to cognitive biases such as motivated reasoning (Nyhan, Reifler, and Ubel 2013; Nyhan et al.
2014; Hart and Nisbet 2012; Nisbet 2005).
With respect to the framing of medical conditions, organizations and movements may
invoke medical experts such as physicians, research scientists, professional associations, and
scientific organizations in order to establish credibility (Epstein 1996). These experts and their
conclusions are often presented by social movements in ways that minimize or altogether ignore
the political, cultural, or social context in which the expert operates but that highlight the values
of technical skills and objectivity (Ahmed 2015). Scientists themselves will engage in what is
known as “boundary work” to set themselves apart from non-scientists, who are not given access
to resources or professional stature and are viewed less favorably (Gieryn 1983). At the same
time, movements that employ science frames also utilize so-called “lay experts” (Huff 2014;
7

Epstein 1995; Wynne 1992), whose personal experiences or unique vantage points (e.g., as a
survivor of a disease or victim of an environmental disaster) may be deemed important for
scientific debates.7 In arguments where credentialed experts can be found on both sides, lay
experts may also serve as tie breakers. For instance, Ahmed (2015: 108) notes that in Gonzales v.
Carhart, where physicians were found on both sides of the case, Justice Kennedy detours around
the medical evidence and focused on lay experts from an amicus brief. This amicus brief
contained first-person anecdotes from women who had previously had abortions, collected by an
antiabortion initiative called Operation Outcry (Huff 2014; Ahmed 2015).
There are some notable examples in Supreme Court litigation of impactful briefs that rely
on arguments tied to science. The earliest and most well-known instance of science framing in
an amicus brief was the Brandeis brief filed in Muller v. Oregon (1908), which cited heavily
from medical and sociological academic journals as part of an argument supporting “protective”
laws for women workers. And in the NAACP school desegregation litigation, the work of social
psychologists (Clark and Clark 1947) was used to establish negative psychological impact of
segregation on children and was picked up by Chief Justice Warren in his Brown v. Board of
Education opinion. Significantly, the involvement of social scientists continued after Brown and
was soon adopted by pro-segregation litigants, who emphasized different scientific studies and

7

An illustration of the dichotomy between experts and lay experts comes from Huff (2014: 316-

318). In South Dakota, a prochoice member of a state legislative task force on abortion wanted
expertise to be signaled by publication in peer reviewed outlets with disclosure of financial
backing, while a prolife member wanted women who had undergone abortions to testify as
experts as well, saying “an expert is someone who has experienced something.”
8

experts than their opponents (Chesler, Sanders, and Kalmuss 1988). This provides yet another
example of both sides in a policy debate employing a science frame.
With this background in mind, I next turn the focus to the ways that abortion has been
framed by both its supporters and its opponents in the United States.

Framing Support for and Opposition to Abortion
It might seem unremarkable that abortion-related interest groups would frame the issue in
scientific terms. Abortion is, after all, a medical procedure. Yet, like policy debates over AIDS
and obesity, abortion sits at the intersection of medicine and morality (Saguy and Riley 2005)
and is a key mobilizing issue for both major political parties within the contemporary political
sphere (Wilcox and Norrander 2002; Abramowitz 1995; Adams 1997). In the abortion policy
space, the prolife and prochoice movements have been extremely active in litigation, which they
have pursued alongside other strategies such as lobbying for favorable legislation, endorsing (or
opposing) candidates, organizing protests, and crafting public appeals.
Within the social movement context, framing is characterized by adaptation and
contentiousness. Evolution in the use of particular frames can reflect changes within movements
or among subsets of activists (Benford and Snow 2000), and interest groups do not necessarily
shy away from contesting the frames used by their opponents (Boscarino 2016). Drawing on
these insights, below I identify trends in the ways abortion opponents and supporters have
framed the abortion issue in the public domain in the late 20th and 21st centuries.

Frames used by the prochoice movement

9

Leading up to Roe, supporters of liberalizing abortion laws relied in part on frames
related to science such as public health and population control (Greenhouse and Siegel 2011).8
Population control was initially seen as a pragmatic alternative argument in spaces where the
women’s movement was not popular, but the racial politics related to this frame presented a
different set of problems by relying upon racist stereotypes about women of color (Ziegler 2013:
20-24).
Concerns about dangerous “back alley” abortions were an important impetus for the
formation of a diverse coalition of groups supporting legal abortions, including both medical and
religious groups (Rosenberg 1995). Along similar lines, Planned Parenthood raised concerns in
its Roe amicus brief about the disproportionate harm to poor women stemming from lack of
access to abortion (Ziegler 2013). Backlash from the rubella outbreak in California in the 1950s
and 60s was also instrumental in generating support for legalizing abortion among the medical
community (Rosenberg 1995).
Indeed, the language of the Roe majority offered encouragement for conceptualizing
abortion in ways related to science and scientific authority. Ahmed (2015: 90) writes that in Roe,
“the Supreme Court painted a picture of medical experts detached from their social and political
contexts [and i]n doing so, the Court was able to defer to expertise understood to be objective,
neutral, and apolitical on a highly contested issue.” In part because the Supreme Court’s decision

8

While the women’s movement did not begin to link its objectives to the liberalization of

abortion laws until the late 1960s and early 1970s, conservative activists like Phyllis Schafly
famously connected abortion to the Equal Rights Amendment, which undermined support for its
ratification (Greenhouse and Siegel 2011).
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did not emphasize population control, this argument fell out of favor with prochoice groups after
Roe (Ziegler 2009; 2013). Instead, prochoice groups opted to focus on frames related to rights,
autonomy, and public health concerns about illegal abortions. Evidence suggests that this
emphasis continued throughout subsequent decades. One analysis of press releases from the mid1990s finds that prochoice groups emphasized rights, privacy, and freedom and “women” (rather
than “mothers” or the “unborn child”) in their public discourse (Andsager 2000).
Professional associations of physicians have also shaped the frames employed in favor of
abortion rights, emphasizing public health and scientific authority. One prominent organization
in this category is the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), which has
been a frequent filer of amicus briefs. While ACOG’s early position on legal abortion reflected
concerns about entering into the political fray (Aries 2003), in the post-Roe era through the
present day, ACOG has taken a strong position in opposition to many abortion regulations. For
instance, a 2014 bulletin from ACOG’s Committee on Health Care for Underserved Women
called for “advocacy to oppose and overturn restrictions, improve access, and mainstream
abortion as an integral component of women’s health care.” ACOG has also published research
bulletins that criticize the methodological flaws in studies relied upon by prolife groups which
assert a causal link between abortion and breast cancer (ACOG 2009). As such, ACOG and other
aligned professional associations sought to establish their authority on the basis of scientific
expertise – a frame which was soon contested by the opposing side.

Frames used by the prolife movement
In the time period leading up to and just following Roe, scholars have documented efforts
by the Republican party to court Catholic voters by taking a position against abortion
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(Greenhouse and Siegel 2011), though the Nixon administration opted not to file a brief in the
Roe litigation. In the 1970s, the Republican Party was also capitalizing on an increasingly close
relationship with evangelical Protestant groups (Martin 1996), who founded groups like the
Moral Majority, the Family Research Council, and Focus on the Family that all opposed abortion
(Huff 2014). No doubt because of the prominence of these religious groups, the morality frame
for opposing abortion was dominant in the early years of abortion litigation.
However, some in the antiabortion movement were concerned that the movement had
become too closely linked with “anti-woman” sentiment (Huff 2014). Indeed, public opinion on
abortion remained fairly static in the two decades following Roe (Rosenberg 1995), and polls
consistently found that a majority of Americans held the view that abortion should be legal in
some, but not all, circumstances (Pew 2017). Some antiabortion groups in the 1990s recognized
that a change in rhetoric emphasizing concern for women could have more persuasive value
because it foregrounded a desire to protect vulnerable women (Ziegler 2018; Cannold 2002;
Rose 2011). One prolife activist characterized the shift like this:
“It is the widespread belief that ‘legal’ means ‘safe’ which is seducing the middle
majority of Americans. Even though they are uncomfortable with the fact that
unborn children are being killed, they tolerate abortion because they believe the lie
that: ‘At least women are being helped.’ But once this lie is exposed, the middle
majority’s thoughts will dramatically change. At that point the middle majority will
begin to ask themselves: ‘If abortion is causing women so much suffering, what are
we doing this for?!’” (quoted in Cannold 2002: 172).
Case studies of the antiabortion movement note that, from the 1990s on, there was a
greater interest in utilizing arguments framed in scientific terms about purported linkages
between abortion and breast cancer, mental illness, and infertility (Huff 2014; Rose 2011). In
1999, two prolife organizations (the Breast Cancer Prevention Institute and the Coalition on
Abortion/Breast Cancer) were established to promote research and public education on the
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supposed link between breast cancer and abortion. Both took issue with organizations like the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the American Cancer Society, and the National
Cancer Institute, all of which rejected the link between abortion and breast cancer incidence
(Huff 2014: 109).
A key component of the “pro-woman” strategy was the emphasis on something that
abortion opponents called “post-abortion syndrome” or PAS, which asserted that women who
had undergone abortions would suffer negative emotional and psychological trauma as a result
(Dadlez and Andrews 2010). 9 Kelly (2014) argues that evangelical crisis pregnancy centers
were responsible for the genesis of the concept of PAS as early as the 1970s, began collaborating
with conservative think tanks in the 1980s, and were successful in diffusing the concept of “postabortion syndrome” to conservative policy makers in the 1990s. The linkage with crisis
pregnancy centers made it easier for the antiabortion movement to identify women who had
negative experiences surrounding abortion and who could serve as “lay experts” (Wynne 1992)
in court filings, testimony before legislative bodies, and in public relations materials. For
example, one amicus filing in the 2016 Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt case was entitled
“The Brief of Sandra Cano and 180 Women Hurt by Abortion” and contained first-hand
narratives from women who had undergone the abortion procedure.
Another way in which antiabortion groups utilized scientific frames was the way in
which they employed the language of science to critique prochoice arguments; this is consistent

9

Because of the questionable credentials of researchers involved with the term (Dadletz and

Andrews 2010; Blanchard 2002) and the nature of the evidence used to support the research
claiming to have identified the effect, the mainstream medical community generally does not
recognize PAS as an established medical condition (Kahn 2002; Billings 2002; Goddick 2002).
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with Meyer and Staggenborg (1996), who note that the presence of one movement in a venue can
force the opposing movement also to operate in that space (see also Solowiej and Collins 2009).
Credibility tactics used by abortion opponents are similar to those used in policy debates over
tobacco use and climate change, particularly the approach of “selling doubt” (Ley 2018; Ziegler
2019; Huff 2014; Oreskes and Conway 2010). For instance, in Gonzales v. Carhart, one prolife
medical group (the American Association of Pro Life Obstetricians and Gynecologists) critiqued
three studies cited by the respondent as not being peer-reviewed or as being simply anecdotal in
nature (Ahmed 2015). In the next section, I explore further the rationales behind framing choices
made in amicus briefs.

Framing and amicus briefs
Why do groups choose to file amicus briefs? The obvious answer is to influence legal
policy, and there is compelling evidence that amicus briefs filed in the U.S. Supreme Court can
affect both justices’ votes (Pacelle et al. 2018; Collins 2008; Kearney and Merrill 2000) as well
as doctrine (Collins, Corley, and Hamner 2015; Wofford 2015). Existing research has also
established that groups will sometimes take advantage of the adversarial structure of the
American legal system and pursue a “neutralizing” strategy against policy opponents who file
amicus briefs, especially in constitutional cases. Solowiej and Collins (2009: 676) note that
counteractive lobbying through amicus briefs is done in order to “both negate their opponents’
influence and to etch their own policy preferences into law.”
However, Solberg and Waltenburg (2006) argue that litigation serves other purposes,
namely attracting new membership, keeping existing membership, and helping the organization
stake out its territory in crowded policy spaces. Filing amicus briefs can heighten a group’s
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visibility and give it judicial experience that can be capitalized upon in future cases (BehuniakLong 1991: 269). Of course, litigation is typically pursued alongside other, more visible forms of
advocacy that may be more likely to attract and retain members (Solberg and Waltenburg 2006:
565).
The framing utilized in amicus briefs will thus reflect the goals of the group or groups
who signed the brief. In particular, the use of science framing has special implications for
professional associations of healthcare providers, who have a vested interest in the boundary
work of distinguishing between “science” and “non science” (Gieryn 1983). Drawing on
existing work (Huff 2014; Ahmed 2015), I operationalize science framing to include language
that emphasizes the expertise of scientists and medical professionals and that relies on the neutral
terminology of empirical and clinical research. Science framing is distinct from discourse that
seeks to provoke an emotional reaction to individual women’s experiences, either by using
charged language (e.g., calling abortion providers “murderers”) or focusing on anecdotes of
individual women’s (negative) experiences. Instead, a prolife amicus brief that frames its
arguments in terms of science might discuss the prevalence of “post abortion syndrome” by
referencing empirical data gathered by a research organization and published in a peer-reviewed
journal.
Beyond science framing, the literature suggests other frames that should also be prevalent
in amicus briefs. One such frame that should be used found in amicus briefs from both sides of
the abortion is a rights frame (Behuniak-Long 1991), which serves to connect their support or
opposition to a Constitutional framework (e.g., “right to privacy,” “right to life”). I conceptualize
this frame broadly to include discourse that also references terms like liberty, equality, freedom,
dignity, and autonomy.

15

As discussed earlier, abortion opponents have historically couched their arguments in
terms of morality (Rohlinger 2002, 2006; Rose 2011), as well as more recently adopting the
frame of “harm to women” (Kelly 2014; Rose 2011).10 For the purposes of this analysis, I follow
the literature in conceptualizing morality framing to include language that emphasizes the moral
repugnance of abortion (e.g., references to killing or murder), that describes fetuses as children
(e.g., references to unborn child), and that refers to women as “mothers” (Wolliver 1998). In
contrast, the “harm to women” frame refers to women-protective language that is intended to
evoke an emotional reaction about women’s experiences with abortion (or unwanted
pregnancies), often centering anecdotal accounts that emphasize negative psychological or
physical outcomes. While morality framing is most closely linked with the prolife movement in
the literature (Rohlinger 2002, 2006; Rose 2011), both sides of the abortion debate can employ
the harm to women frame (Huff 2014; Jesuadson and Weitz 2015). For instance, a prochoice
group might center a particular woman’s traumatic experience with domestic violence as a
reason for her to have access to abortion services, while a prolife group might highlight a woman
from Operation Outcry who experienced grief and depression as a result of an abortion.
In general, the literature suggests that prolife groups should be less apt to use science
frames than prochoice groups. But, because of organizational maintenance goals, some types of
amici will be especially likely to make appeals to credibility that entail science framing.

10

Both of these frames serve organizational maintenance objectives: the former, by resonating

with evangelicals and Catholics who were already supporters of the movement, and the latter by
attempting recruit more supporters through communicating compassion for women who seek
abortions (Reardon 1996).
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Specifically, groups in the healthcare and health policy sector as well as single-issue groups in
the abortion or reproductive rights policy space will have a stronger incentive to couch their legal
arguments in the language of science, compared to religious groups. This leads to the following
expectations:
H1: All else equal, the science frame will be used less frequently in prolife briefs than in
prochoice briefs.
H2: Amicus briefs from healthcare or health policy groups will use more science framing
than briefs from religious groups.
H3: Amicus briefs from abortion-oriented groups or reproductive rights groups will use
more science framing than briefs from religious groups.
Drawing from the social movement literature, I expect that the strategies of abortion
opponents and supporters will be dynamic (Solowiej and Collins 2009; Meyer and Staggenborg
1996; Jesudason and Weitz 2015), and that within each movement, there will not be a monolithic
approach (Rohlinger 2006; Ziegler 2013). As such, amicus briefs are likely to use a mix of
strategies in order to present their position, though the particular mix will vary depending on
whether the brief takes a prolife or prochoice position. Case studies on prolife movement
strategy have identified several interest groups who de-emphasized the morality frame in favor
of characterizing abortion as harmful to women (e.g., Rose 2011). Some of these groups also
were active in promoting asserted links between negative mental health outcomes and abortion,
as well as other negative health consequences that would be described in the language of science
(Huff 2014). At the same time, other prolife groups discussed abortion with morality language
that focused on the fetus as a child. On the prochoice side, science frames should accompany or
bolster arguments about rights, as well as harm to women.

17

H4: In prolife amicus briefs, use of the harm-women frame will be positively related to the
use of the science frame.
H5: In prolife amicus briefs, use of the morality frame will be negatively related to use of
the science frame.
H6: In prochoice amicus briefs, use of rights frames and harm-women frames will be
positively related to usage of science frames.
Data and variables
To test these hypotheses, I first obtained the full text of 359 amicus briefs from Westlaw,
drawn from the merits stage of all Supreme Court cases in which the constitutional right to an
abortion was the central issue. I exclude cases that deal with abortion protests because such cases
focus on First Amendment claims, rather than the constitutional right to an abortion.11 In order to
focus on the content of legal arguments, the briefs were trimmed so that they included content
only from the Summary of Argument forward, omitting introductory material (e.g., Table of
Contents, Table of Authorities, Statement of the Facts). Each brief was then coded as to whether
it supported the prolife position. The variable, Prolife, is coded as 1 if the amicus brief sides with
the litigant advocating in favor of restrictions to the right to abortion, and 0 if the amicus brief
sides with the litigant advocating against restrictions of the abortion right.

11

In order to preserve independence of observations, three cases that dealt with the right to

abortion were not included in the analysis because the cases were either consolidated with
another abortion case that year, or because there were duplicate briefs for two cases heard at the
same time: Doe v. Bolton (1973), Williams v. Zbaraz (1980), Ohio v. Akron Center (1990).
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To create measures of the science frame as well as other frames, I utilized a commonly
employed automated content analysis software called Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count
(LIWC), which was developed by James Pennebaker and colleagues to analyze the psychological
properties of texts (Pennebaker et al. 2003; Taucszik and Pennebaker 2010). This tool has been
used in a variety of studies focused on legal settings (Bryan and Ringsmuth 2016; Corley and
Wedeking 2014; Owens, Wedeking, and Wolfarth 2013). However, unlike previous work, I
leveraged LIWC’s capacity for creating customized dictionaries in order to tailor my analysis to
the abortion issue using the corpus of amicus and litigant briefs. Regardless of which dictionary
(LIWC standard or customized) is employed, the software reports the percentage of words that
fall into specified categories. Although LIWC (like all automated content analysis programs) has
its strengths and weaknesses, it is well suited for analyses like this which require a systematic
accounting of specific terms in a large corpus of texts (see also Bryan and Ringsmuth 2016).12
Ideally, this analysis would utilize dictionaries already developed and validated in the
abortion literature. However, there has been no systematic analysis of framing across the entire
post-Roe period, and the few studies that have focused on framing are hampered by either their
limited focus on a single case or methodological limitations related to construction of the
frames.13 Thus, I opted to develop custom dictionaries that drew terms from other studies of
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Indeed, as of 2010, LIWC was used in 121 published research studies across the social

sciences (Taucszik and Pennebaker 2010).
13

Specifically, Andsager (2000) content analyzes one year of press releases and news stories

about late-term abortion, while Behuniak-Long content analyzes legal arguments filed in a single
case (Webster v. Reproductive Health Services). Given the emphasis of this manuscript, a more
promising approach was employed by Moyer, Balcom, and Hendricks (2019), who descriptively
compare three frames (morality, harm-women, and science) used by amici in four abortion cases
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movement strategy that used primary source documents from prolife and prochoice groups (Huff
2014; Rose 2011; Gerrity 2010; Wolliver 1998; Andsager 2000). Each custom dictionary
included words that were unique to the frame, so there was no overlap between constructs.14 I
then validated the custom dictionaries with terms in the LIWC 2015 standard dictionary, which
has been shown to have strong external validity (Frimera et al. 2015; Kahn et al. 2007).
Appendix A lists the words that appear in the custom dictionaries for the four frames
created specifically for this analysis: science, morality, harm-women, and rights. The dependent
variable, science, encompasses terms that denotes professional expertise, clinical language, and
scientific research. As expected, this variable is highly correlated with two related terms
(biology and health) from the LIWC 2015 standard dictionary (both at r = .65). As expected, it is
not closely correlated with emotional language in general (r = .03) and negative emotional
language in particular (r = .04).
The other three frames serve as control variables in the analysis. Morality, which
emphasizes the moral repugnance of abortion and equates abortion with murder, is moderately

using LIWC. However, because of the degree to which there was overlap in the terms used for
the science frame and the harm-women frame, it was not possible to isolate the extent to which
individual frames were employed, necessitating a different approach. Moreover, the Moyer,
Balcom, and Hendricks (2019) analysis is purely descriptive and does not include measures of
group types or other controls.
14

As noted above, the framing approach used here builds and improves upon the approach used

by Moyer, Balcom, and Hendricks (2019). I revised their custom dictionaries, using four
dictionaries compared to their three (adding rights as a frame), removed duplication of terms
across frames, and validated the updated frames using the LIWC standard dictionary terms. A
comparison with the frames used here shows that the science frame used here is correlated with
the Moyer et al. science frame at .82, while the harm to women frame is correlated at .60.
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correlated with the LIWC standard dictionary frame of death (r = .55). The frame harm-women
includes language that centers the negative emotional and physical experiences of women and is
strongly correlated with the LIWC dictionary frame of negative emotion (r = .81), which includes
sadness, anxiety, and anger. Lastly, the rights frame includes language of authoritative legal
constructs, like “privacy” and “liberty.” The LIWC standard dictionary admittedly does not have
close analogs to these concepts, but rights is moderately correlated with clout (r = .26).
According to the LIWC operator’s manual (2015), clout indicates that the author is speaking
from a perspective of high expertise and confidence. In addition to these frames, I include a
control for brief length, taking the log of the word count variable from the standard LIWC output
to account for its skewed distribution.
The briefs were coded for a range of attributes. I include a variable, Total Groups, that is
the total number of signees on the brief, as briefs with multiple signees may exhibit a less
cohesive messaging strategy than briefs with a single group.15 Because of the skewed distribution
of the variable, I take the log of the total number of signees.
I also classified the types of groups who were signees to each amicus brief filed at the
merits stage (see Appendix B). Most briefs (73%) had one or more signees from a single group
type, while 15% were signed by two group types, and 14% by three or more group types. Health
groups included both professional associations representing healthcare personnel (e.g., American
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Groups may perceive a credibility advantage to collaboration with other co-signers on a brief,

as opposed to solo briefs (Behuniak-Long 1991). The empirical findings on influence clearly
show that not all collaborations are created equal in terms of their success in influencing
Supreme Court decision (Box-Steffensmeier, Christensen, and Hitt 2013; Goelzhauser and
Vouvalis 2014). However, because the focus of this paper is how groups frame their arguments,
and not whether the arguments are successful, this line of work is outside the scope of this paper.
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College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), American Association of Prolife
Gynecologists (AAPLOG) as well as health policy non-profit organizations (e.g., Elliot Institute,
Guttmacher Institute). Religious groups include both groups who are official representatives of a
religious institution (e.g., U.S. Catholic Conference of Bishops) as well as religiously affiliated
groups (e.g., Family Research Council, Unitarians for Reproductive Choice).
Other group types include professional associations (non-healthcare associations like
National Association of Women Lawyers), social welfare organizations (ACLU, Concerned
Women for America), and abortion or reproductive rights groups (e.g., National Right to Life,
NARAL, Planned Parenthood). Another dummy variable indicates whether there was a mix of
group types including health, as briefs with some input from health-related organizations may be
more likely to employ science framing than those without those groups’ involvement.
I also control for two types of government briefs. First, I include a dummy variable
indicating whether the brief was filed by the Solicitor General. There is substantial evidence that
the Office of the Solicitor General is a formidable presence in Supreme Court litigation (Pacelle
2003; Bailey and Kamoie 2005; Deen, Ignagni, and Meernik 2003). During this time period, the
Solicitor General filed a brief in six cases and sided with the prolife position in five of those.
Beyond the Solicitor General, it is relatively common for government actors, including state
attorneys general, members of Congress, and state legislators to file amicus briefs (Gleason and
Provost 2015; Goelzhauser and Vouvalis 2014) as a form of position taking (Mayhew 1974). In
these data, 56 amicus briefs were filed by public officials at the local, state, or federal level;
about two-thirds of these briefs took the prolife position in the case. With respect to
directionality, it is plausible that government signees would wish to assert their credibility
through the language of science, particularly when defending restrictive abortion laws that
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reference scientific concepts; however, public officials may also find it advantageous to
emphasize emotional appeals over the neutral language of science. As such, I do not have strong
directional expectations for either variable.
Because past research finds that amicus groups often repeat arguments raised by their
aligned litigant (Wofford 2015; Collins, Corley, and Hamner 2015) and that litigants are
increasingly coordinating efforts with aligned amicus groups (Larson and Devins 2016), I control
for the use of science frame in the petitioner or respondent’s brief, depending on the side with
which the amicus aligns itself.
Lastly, the analysis accounts for the Supreme Court era in which the case was heard, an
important consideration given the doctrinal shifts and personnel changes to the Court during the
1973-2016. I control for two major points in time that may have influenced the framing strategies
of groups involved in Supreme Court litigation in the period after Roe. The first shift occurs
after the Court’s 1992 decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, which established the “undue
burden” test. While still upholding abortion as a constitutional right, the decision allowed for
more regulation of abortion throughout all stages of pregnancy than Roe had, so long as those
policies were designed to “inform the woman’s free choice, not hinder it” (505 U.S. 833 (1992).
This provided an opening for abortion opponents to highlight what they viewed as the negative
health consequences of abortion for women through policies like informed consent provisions
and mandatory counseling scripts (both of which were deemed acceptable in Casey).
The second shift on the Court that may have influenced the framing calculus of amici was
the replacement of Sandra Day O’Connor with Samuel Alito in January 2006. Crucially,
O’Connor had been part of the plurality ruling that declined to overturn Roe in 1992. In contrast,
Alito was a much more conservative justice with a record of opposition to a constitutional right
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to abortion (Keck and McMahon 2016). Alito’s replacement of O’Connor also had the effect of
creating a new “swing” justice on the Court: Anthony Kennedy.16 Although Justice Kennedy,
like O’Connor, had declined to overturn Roe in Casey, he had, in a 2000 dissenting opinion, used
the word “abortionist” to refer to a physician, referred to an aborted fetus as a “child,” and
described a late-term abortion procedure in graphic terms as one that “ended human life” (530
U.S. at 914).17 Thus, there was an incentive for antiabortion amici to de-emphasize science
frames in favor of morality arguments in order to reach Justice Kennedy and a more conservative
Court.
[Figure 1 about here]
Results
Across all cases, amicus briefs filed by prochoice groups exhibit a significantly higher
usage of science framing than briefs by prolife groups, as indicated by a difference-of-means test
(p < 0.001). This lends preliminary support to the prediction in Hypothesis 1 that prochoice
groups will use the science frame more frequently than prolife groups. However, aggregating
across the entire time period obscures potentially important differences in how each side crafted
its arguments in individual cases. Figure 1 graphs the mean use of the science frame for all
prochoice and prolife groups by case, showing considerable variation from case to case.
Looking at the beginning and endpoints of the time period under study reveals an interesting
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Similarly, one study of the Webster case argues that appellees delegated to amicus groups the

task of targeting Justice O’Connor with their arguments (Behuniak-Long 1991).
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After 2006, the High Court decided Gonzales v. Carhart in 2007, followed by Whole Woman’s

Health v. Hellerstedt in 2016, and June Services v. Russo in 2020. June Services is not included
in this analysis.
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shift, however. In Roe (the first case in the series), science framing was much more prominent in
prochoice briefs than their prolife counterparts, but by WWH in 2016, the average use of the
science frame was very similar among amici on both sides of the abortion issue. This illustrates
the way in which movements adopt successful strategies from counter-movements when it is
strategically beneficial for them (Boscarino 2016; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; Jesudason and
Weitz 2015).
[Figure 2 here]
Next, Figure 2 graphs the average use of the science frame across the type of
organization(s) filing the brief over the 1973-2016 time period. Here, for clarity of presentation,
I focus on briefs signed by a single group type (representing 73% of the total sample). On
average and consistent with Hypothesis 2, amicus briefs from health groups (the solid line) use
science framing more often than briefs signed by religious organizations (represented by the line
with the open circle). In fact, health groups consistently use science framing at higher levels than
all other single-group types, except for one year (2007). That year, in Gonzales v. Carhart, one
prolife brief filed by the Thomas More Society, a conservative public interest law firm, slightly
exceeded the science usage of health groups. In that brief, the word “data” was used 33 times and
the word “statistics” 10 times.
While these descriptive findings are suggestive, a multivariate approach is needed to
control for other factors that drive framing strategy by amici. Because the dependent variable is
a bounded proportion that ranges from 0 to .047, OLS is not an appropriate estimation technique.
Following the conventions of existing work (Collins, Corley, and Hamner 2015), I estimate a
series of models using fractional logit (Papke and Woodridge 1996) and cluster errors on the
case.
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[Table 1 about here]
In the first two columns of Table 1, fractional logit models that analyze prolife and
prochoice amicus briefs together are displayed.18 Turning first to the hypothesized expectations
for the combined model, we can see by the negative coefficient on the Prolife variable that
Hypothesis 1’s prediction that prolife groups will use the science frame less than prochoice
groups is supported. Figure 3 shows that, when all other variables are held at their means, the
proportion of language in the science frame is .003 higher for prochoice briefs compared to
prolife briefs.
In addition, Hypothesis 2 is supported, as the results show that amicus briefs by health
groups utilized the science frame to a greater extent than did religious groups. Briefs filed by a
mix of group types that include healthcare or health policy organizations also used significantly
more science framing than multi-group briefs without health groups. Interestingly, the use of
science framing was not statistically distinguishable between amicus briefs from abortion and
reproductive rights groups compared to briefs from religious groups (the excluded reference
category), in contrast with the expectations laid out in Hypothesis 3. Briefs filed by government
officials utilized significantly less science framing than those from religious groups, but no effect
is found for the Solicitor General. When the reference category for single-type briefs is rotated
so that health groups are the excluded category (column 2), we see that, compared to health
groups, briefs filed by any other type of group are significantly less likely to use science framing.
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Supplemental analysis using the LIWC dictionary word of biology as a dependent variable is

shown in the Appendix. The results are somewhat weaker but show support for Hypotheses 1 –
3 as well as for most control variables.
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Both government and Solicitor General amicus briefs are also significantly less likely than health
briefs to use the language of science to frame their arguments.19
[Figure 3 here]
Several other variables emerge as predictors of science framing. Consistent with the
literature on repetition by amicus groups and litigant-amicus coordination (Collins, Corley, and
Hamner 2015; Larson and Devins 2016; Wofford 2015), a litigant’s choice to couch their
arguments in the language of science has a large, positive impact on framing by amici who take
the same side. Holding all other variables at the means, when science framing by the aligned
litigant goes from its minimum to maximum value, the predicted effect of amicus science
framing doubles in size. The results in Table 1 also show that briefs with more morality and
rights framing used significantly less science framing, while the usage of harm-women frames
was not related to science framing.20 Lastly, the time period variables do not appear to exert a
significant influence on the use of the science frame.21
Next, in columns 3 and 4, I break out prolife and prochoice amicus briefs into separate
models in order to evaluate the last three hypotheses. Looking first at the prolife model (column
3), we see strong support for both hypotheses related to competing and complementary frames.
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It should be noted that all but one of the SG briefs in these cases were filed by Republican

administrations because of the prevalence of Republican presidents during this time period.
20

There were no directional expectations associated with this variable in the combined model. It

is also worth noting that the frame harm-women is only weakly correlated with the science frame
(r = .10).
21

In order to test whether there was a general time trend for the use of science, an alternate

specification included year as a continuous variable, rather than using cut points. However, the
results are consistent with the findings from the main model.
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Consistent with Hypothesis 4, the more that prolife amici emphasize the frame about harm to
women, the more the brief will utilize the science frame as well. Additionally, in support of
Hypothesis 5, prolife amicus briefs that use more morality language do emphasize science less
frequently, suggesting that the two frames are generally not used in tandem. These findings are
consistent with the conclusions of case studies on antiabortion groups, which noted a shift in
strategy by some antiabortion groups (Huff 2014; Rose 2007, 2011).
As with the combined models, the more that the aligned litigant uses science framing, the
more such framing will be used in prolife amicus briefs. With respect to group types, healthoriented organizations are still more likely to use more science language than most other groups
(as indicated by the negative coefficients), except for professional organizations and the residual
category (other). However, briefs signed by a mix of groups including health organizations are
no more likely to use science framing than briefs with a mix of other groups. Lastly, the more
signees on a brief, the less science framing appears in the argumentation, and none of the time
period variables reach significance.22
Moving to the prochoice model (column 4), Hypothesis 6 predicts that amicus briefs that
use more language about rights and harm to women will also use more language in the science
frame. However, this hypothesis is unsupported, as both rights and harm-women are significant
but in the opposite direction as hypothesized. This would suggest that these alternative frames
are competing rather than complementary in their usage. Amicus briefs filed by health
organizations (the excluded category) again use more science framing than all other types of
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Using a continuous variable for time, rather than cut points, yields identical results.
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groups, and we also see a positive effect for the amount of science framing used by the aligned,
prochoice litigant.
Interestingly, in contrast to the findings from previous models, here we do see evidence
that framing considerations of prochoice groups may have been influenced by changes to the
composition of the Supreme Court and shifts in legal doctrine. As evidenced by the time dummy
variables, prochoice amicus briefs filed after the Casey ruling use more science framing than
similar briefs filed before this decision. This suggests that abortion supporters sought to use
science-based arguments under the new undue burden standard in Casey. But after the
appointment of Justice Alito in 2006, prochoice briefs used less science framing than they had
during the previous era. (The post-Alito time period (2006-2016) is not significantly different
from the 1973-1992 post-Roe era, however.) The post-Alito shift might indicate a calculation by
abortion supporters about the kinds of arguments that Justice Kennedy, the new swing voter,
might find more palatable – namely, that science might not be their best avenue for persuasion.
However, the results from the prolife model do not provide any evidence of similar
considerations by amici opposing abortion rights.
Discussion
This study makes several key substantive and methodological contributions. First, I test
and fail to find strong evidence for the claim from the social movement literature that the
antiabortion movement made a strategic shift toward rhetorical arguments emphasizing science.
The results here indicate that, at least in the Supreme Court setting, the framing of science is
used more often by prochoice amicus groups than by antiabortion ones, all else equal. Future
research might compare movement articulations (e.g., activist speeches and press releases) with
amicus filings for the same group to tease out when and why divergences in arguments occur.
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However, the finding that both prochoice and prolife health organizations’ briefs rely on
science frames does help further our understanding of movement-countermovement dynamics.
The counteractive lobbying argument contends that groups seek to neutralize their opponents by
filing amicus briefs (Solowiej and Collins 2009); the results here extend that argument to the
frames used within the briefs. By employing a science frame, an antiabortion group can
neutralize their opponent’s monopoly on that frame. Science framing lends an air of credibility,
establishes boundaries related to expertise, and elevates claims by asserting they are based on
neutral evidence (Layzer 2012; Ahmed 2015; Gieryn 1983). For instance, in amicus briefs filed
by the prochoice American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) and the prolife
American Association of Pro Life Obstetricians and Gynecologists (AAPLOG), each
organization uses its members’ credentials and connections to markers of status (e.g., peerreviewed publications, institutional affiliations) to legitimize and provide credibility for the legal
arguments they advance about abortion (Huff 2014). While this study focuses on abortion,
future work could extend the approach used here to examine science framing in other areas of
health policy as well as environmental litigation. If both sides of a case can point to arguments
couched in the language of science, this may make it easier for justices to legitimize their
ideologically preferred position.
Interestingly, I do not find evidence that prolife groups, on the whole, were responsive to
changes in doctrine and Supreme Court composition, as some previous work has suggested
(Rose 2011). But prochoice amici did increase their use of science framing after the Supreme
Court’s decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey introduced the “undue burden” standard, then
de-emphasized it after Justice O’Connor was replaced by Samuel Alito. With Justice Kennedy as
the new “swing” justice, it is possible that prochoice groups determined that other ways of
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talking about the right to an abortion would be more persuasive. Although beyond the scope of
this paper, additional research into the influence of differing frames on Supreme Court decisions
would help determine whether, and to what extent, this calculation paid off.
This study also helps to advance the scholarship on amicus briefs by extending a
methodological approach to content analysis that, in the judicial literature, has been used
primarily to analyze judicial opinions (Bryan and Ringsmuth 2016; Corley and Wedeking 2014;
Owens, Wedeking, and Wolfarth 2013). Here, I am able to analyze the content of 359 amicus
briefs filed over four decades of abortion litigation before the Supreme Court. A major asset of
LIWC is that it allows researchers to create custom dictionaries or use well-validated existing
dictionaries about the psychological content of texts (Taucszik and Pennebaker 2010). These
features are useful for scholars who want to explore a particular policy area in depth and do so in
a systematic way. For instance, other possible applications of LIWC to framing could examine
briefs filed in cases related to religious liberty, LGBTQ rights, or affirmative action.
Substantively, the findings also connect to work on the relationship between litigants and
amicus curiae groups (Wofford 2015; Collins, Corley, and Hamner 2015). Amici in abortion
cases are responsive to the use of science by their aligned litigant, increasing their use of science
frame when the party’s brief relies more heavily on that framing. While these data do not allow
us to establish whether there is formal coordination between litigants and amici, there is
anecdotal evidence that this is increasingly occurring (Larson and Devins 2016; Ward 2007;
Smith 1998). Future work should continue to explore the nature and impact of such
collaborations (see Box-Steffensmeier, Christensen, and Hitt 2013; Wofford 2015).
There are, of course, limitations to this study. While systematic, the LIWC approach to
identifying frames focuses on words and phrases, and as such, may miss out on important
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context that would be revealed by a close reading of fewer texts. It is also possible that a brief
might reference a frame that it is not endorsing; however, by repeating the language associated
with that frame, this can have the unintended effect of reinforcing it (Lakoff 2004; Nyhan,
Reifler, and Ubel 2013). Other possible approaches to categorizing frames could focus on
precedents cited within a brief (Hinkle 2015), the type and number of legal rules proposed
(Wofford 2020), or even how a single organization’s use of a frame changes across a series of
cases. Beyond these points, it is important to acknowledge that framing choices by social
movement organizations are likely to vary based on venue and intended audience; persuading the
public is a very different enterprise than attempting to persuade the Supreme Court or a state
legislature, and different frames could be used simultaneously by the same group. Amicus briefs
filed in the Supreme Court are also interjecting their views at a late stage in litigation, after
having had the opportunity to see how lower court judges have assessed competing arguments
below. The results here do not, then, reflect earlier iterations of linguistic strategies employed by
social movement organizations in the same case. Certain types of abortion laws are also
unquestionably more amenable to science framing than others. For instance, the Texas law about
admitting privileges at issue in Whole Woman’s Health lends itself well to empirical claims
about medical necessity, and the data do show that the average use of science framing was very
similar for prolife and prochoice amici in this case. Lastly, the results here cannot answer the
question of whether justices are more receptive to certain types of frames than others, leaving
that work for future research.
Going forward, there are some indications that divisions in public opinion about science
may influence the strategies used by groups in the abortion policy space. In 2016, polling
revealed an 11% gap between Democrats and Republicans with respect to their trust in science
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and scientific experts; since then, the gap has only increased (Funk et al. 2019), and some issues
like climate science show even larger gaps between Democrats and Republicans (Hart and
Nisbet 2012). Other work finds that holding anti-intellectualist and populist beliefs decreases
acceptance of the scientific consensus on issues like climate change and GMO’s (Merkeley
2021). If organizations calculate that Supreme Court justices are similarly divided along
ideological lines in their views on science, other ways to frame the issue of abortion may emerge
as important in the future.
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Table 1: Fractional Logit Models of Science Framing in Amicus Briefs (1973-2016)
Brief Characteristics
Prolife position
Litigant use of science frame
in brief
Morality frame
Harm to women frame
Rights frame
Total groups on amicus brief
(logged)
Word count (logged)

All Amicus Briefs
Coef. (RSE)
Coef. (RSE)
-.243*
-.292*
(.087)
(.073)
24.9*
23.7*
(5.77)
(5.00)
-13.63*
-13.6*
(3.04)
(3.04)
2.46
-.223
(6.02)
(6.21)
-35.0*
-39.2*
(9.94)
(10.7)
-.006
-.035
(.021)
(.019)
.095
.084
(.071)
(.082)

Prolife Amicus
Coef. (RSE)
--

Prochoice Amicus
Coef. (RSE)
--

37.8*
(12.6)
-11.99*
(4.82)
28.1*
(14.3)
-54.0*
(7.30)
-.056*
(.029)
.165
(.141)

11.8*
(2.56)
-11.7
(7.63)
-7.39*
(3.25)
-30.9*
(11.5)
-.043
(.028)
-.109
(.136)

--

--

--

-.074
(.090)
-.251*
(.114)
-.213
(.142)
-.313
(.163)
-.089
(.207)
-.187
(.112)
.237*
(.089)

-.523*
(.154)
-.466*
(.098)
-.582*
(.136)
-.636*
(.178)
-.708*
(.179)
-.490*
(.213)
-.509*
(.116)
-.118*
(.088)

-.362*
(.161)
-.375*
(.139)
-.414*
(.128)
-.814*
(.160)
-.481*
(.155)
-.366
(.330)
-.521
(.387)
.070
(.214)

-1.22*
(.182)
-.461*
(.189)
-.684*
(.142)
-.406*
(.131)
-.855*
(.252)
-.691*
(.202)
-.535*
(.182)
-.145
(.094)

.141
(.092)
.067
(.072)
-5.06*
(.554)
359
.029

.141
(.092)
.067
(.072)
-4.44*
(.699)
359
.027

-.219
(.276)
-.066
(.196)
-5.59*
(1.23)
193
.033

.309*
(.096)
.003
(.103)
-2.63*
(1.18)
166
.021

Group Attributes
Health

.595*
(.070)
--

Religious
Abortion/reproductive rights
Government
Solicitor General
Social welfare
Professional association
Other
Health in combination with
other groups
Era
1993-2005
2006-2016
Constant
N
Pseudo R2

Notes: Model is significant at p < .001. Errors are clustered on the case. * denotes p < .05 (two-tailed
test).
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Figure 1: Use of Science Frame in Prochoice and Prolife Amicus Briefs, 1973-2016
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Figure 2: Use of science frames by amicus group type

Note: Results shown only for briefs with a single group type.
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Figure 3: Predicted effects of brief position on science framing

Note: Predicted effects with 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 4: Predicted effects of morality framing by prolife groups on use of science frames

Note: Predicted effects with 95% confidence intervals.
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Appendix A: LIWC Dictionaries
Science
Accepted medical pract*
Accredit*
Adverse reaction
Breast cancer
Causal*
Comorbidity
Complication*
Data
Diagnos*
Disease
Evidence
Expert*
Female*
Fetal pain
Fetus
Gynecol*
Healthcare
Maternal mortality
Medical necessity
Medical prof*
Mental health
Obstet*
Oncolog*
Physician*
PAS
PASS
PAT
Patient*
Peer review*
Physician*
Post abortion distress
Post abortion psychosis
Post abortion stress
Post abortion syndrome
Post abortion trauma
Probabilit*
Procedure*
Public health
Research*
Risk*
Statistic*
Study
Studies

Morality
Abortion doctor*
Abortion industry
Abortionist
Alive
Baby
Babies
Body part*
Child*
Conceive*
Conception
Cruel*
Dead
Death*
Defenseless
Die*
Dying
Faith
Holy
Human*
Immoral
Infant*
Innocent*
Kill*
Life
Mother*
Murder*
Personhood
Religion
Sacred
Unborn

Harm to Women
Abuse*
Abusive
Alone
Anxi*
Ashamed
Blood*
Bled
Bleed*
Cry
Crie*
Depress*
Emotion*
Endanger*
Grief*
Griev*
Harm*
Hemorrhag*
Hurt*
Infect*
Lonely
Maternal health
Pain*
Pressure*
Rape*
Regret*
Shame
Suffer*
Suicid*
Survivor*
Trauma*
Unsafe
Upset*
Victim*
Violence

Rights
Autonomy
Bodily integrity*
Choice*
Choose*
Decide*
Decision*
Dignity
Equal*
Equit*
Free*
Libert*
Privacy
Private
Right*

Note: * denotes word stem (e.g., right* would include both “right” and “rights”). Terms with
different hyphenations and spelling variations of the same term are included (“postabortion”
“post abortion” and “post-abortion”).
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Appendix B: Amicus group types
Group Type

Examples

Single group type
Healthcare and health policy

American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (ACOG), American Association of
Prolife Obstetricians and Gynecologists
(AAPLOG), Catholic Health Association,
American Nurses Association

Religious groups

U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Southern
Baptist Convention, Knights of Columbus, Focus
on the Family

Professional associations

National Association of Women Lawyers, Alabama
Lawyers for Unborn Children, American Sociology
Association

Social welfare organizations

NAACP, ACLU, Concerned Women for America,
Center for Constitutional Rights

Abortion or reproductive rights groups

Planned Parenthood, NARAL, Feminists for Life,
National Right to Life

Government

Attorney general of New Jersey, 50 Arizona
legislators, 20 members of the U.S. Congress

Office of the U.S. Solicitor General
(OSG)

Charles Fried, Kenneth Starr, Seth Waxman

Briefs with multiple group types
Mix of group types including
healthcare/policy

Brief by Health Professionals Advancing LGBT
Equality, National Center for Lesbian Rights, Bay
Area Lawyers for Individual Freedom, and
National Black Justice Coalition
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Appendix C: Fractional Logit Models of Biology Framing in Amicus Briefs (1973-2016)
All Amicus Briefs
Coef. (RSE)
Coef. (RSE)
-.064
-.093*
(.043)
(.038)
11.2*
8.81
(4.60)
(4.64)
2.45
2.79
(1.51)
(1.67)
11.98
10.4
(6.20)
(6.29)
-8.71*
-10.7*
(4.41)
(4.67)
.016
.002
(.015)
(.015)
-.011
-.011
(.037)
(.040)

Brief Characteristics
Prolife position
Litigant use of science frame
in brief
Morality frame
Harm to women frame
Rights frame
Total groups on amicus brief
(logged)
Word count (logged)
Group Attributes
Health

.320*
(.045)
--

Religious
Abortion/reproductive rights
Government
Solicitor General
Social welfare
Professional association
Other
Health in combination with
other groups
Era
1993-2005
2006-2016
Constant
N
Pseudo R2

--

.001
(.087)
-.078
(.069)
.092
(.097)
-.161*
(.045)
-.024
(.069)
-.197*
(.048)
.174*
(.043)

-.213*
(.059)
-.184*
(.076)
-.232*
(.076)
-.114
(.104)
-.346*
(.056)
-.213*
(.077)
-.346*
(.045)
.005
(.033)

-.020
(.062)
.098
(.073)
-3.51*
(.261)
359
.006

-.034
(.063)
.090
(.073)
-3.17*
(.296)
359
.006

Notes: Model is significant at p < .001. Errors are clustered on the case. * denotes p < .05 (twotailed test).
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